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SIGNED GENERAL RELEASES MAY BE WORTH LESS THAN
EMPLOYERS EXPECTED: CIRCUITS SPLIT ON WHETHER
FORMER EMPLOYEE CAN SIGN RELEASE, REAP ITS BENEFIT,
AND SUE FOR FMLA CLAIM ANYWAY
MUNIZA BAWANEY*
INTRODUCTION
There is a general public policy favoring the post-dispute settlement of
claims.' And why wouldn't there be? After all, litigation is socially waste-
ful. 2 Indeed, litigation is often described as a "zero-sum" game, which
transfers assets from party A to party B without any resulting gain in soci-
ety's wealth.3 Moreover, when one realizes that litigation requires the
costly intervention of lawyers and the courts, it is not difficult to see how
the transfer of assets from party A to party B actually results in a loss to
society wealth.4 In contrast, waiver agreements result in a surplus of soci-
ety's wealth. 5 In a waiver agreement, the potential plaintiff waives his
claim for compensation from the potential defendant. 6 The waiver results in
a net gain shared by the potential parties and is usually quantified in pre-
cisely the same amount as the loss from litigation.7
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1. See, e.g., Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 373 (4th Cir. 2005), reh'g granted,
No. 04-1525, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15744 (4th Cir. 2006).
2. For a more detailed view of this assertion and specific examples of when litigation is most
wasteful, refer to Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic
Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 209 (2000).
3. Id. at 217.
4. Id. at 217-18.
5. Id. at 221. For an in-depth discussion on wealth maximization, see Richard A. Posner, Utili-
tarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
6. Hylton, supra note 2, at 220.
7. For a detailed explanation of how waiver agreements result in a net gain in precisely the same
amount as the loss from litigation, see id. at 220-23.
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The Fifth Circuit, 8 in Faris v. Nextira LLC, recognized the public pol-
icy of favoring the enforcement of post-dispute waivers or settlement
agreements when it ruled that the post-termination release 9 signed by the
plaintiff was enforceable notwithstanding 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d), a regula-
tion issued pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
("FMLA"). 10 This regulation states in pertinent part, "Employees cannot
waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their rights under
FMLA. For example, employees (or their collective bargaining representa-
tives) cannot 'trade off the right to take FMLA leave against some other
benefit offered by the employer.""l l
The Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that § 825.220(d) applies only to
waivers of substantive rights under the FMLA, such as rights to leave and
reinstatement, and not to retaliation claims brought by former employees. 12
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of § 825.220(d) was not questioned until
recently when the Fourth Circuit 13 reached a strikingly different conclusion
under practically the same set of facts in Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc. 14
According to the Fourth Circuit in Taylor, § 825.220(d) bars the prospec-
8. The Fifth Circuit is the Federal Court of Appeals for Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
9. The release that the plaintiff signed in Faris v. Nextira LLC was essentially a general release
that purported to waive her rights to all claims arising under any federal, state, or local law or regula-
tion. The release did not specifically mention the Family Medical Leave Act. Fais v. Williams WPC-I,
Inc. (Faris v. Nextira LLC), 332 F.3d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 2003).
10. Id. at 322.
The FMLA was enacted on February 5, 1993. In general, FMLA entitles an "eligible
employee" to take up to a total of 12 workweeks of unpaid leave during any 12-month period
for the birth of a child and to care for such child, for the placement of a child for adoption or
foster care, to care for a spouse or an immediate family member with a serious health condi-
tion, or when he or she is unable to work because of a serious health condition. Employers
covered by the law are required to maintain any pre-existing group health coverage during the
leave period and, once the leave period is concluded, to reinstate the employee to the same or
an equivalent job with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions
of employment.
Supplementary Information: Family and Medical Leave Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2180 (Jan. 6, 1995);
see also 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000). Unless otherwise stated, all future references in the main text to 29
C.F.R. § 825.220 and its respective subsections will be in the form of the section (and subsection)
number only (e.g. § 825.220, § 825.220(d)).
11. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2005). The rest of 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) reads as follows:
This does not prevent an employee's voluntary and uncoerced acceptance (not as a condition
of employment) of a "light duty" assignment while recovering from a serious health condi-
tion. In such a circumstance the employee's right to restoration to the same or an equivalent
position is available until 12 weeks have passed within the 12-month period, including all
FMLA leave taken and the period of "light duty."
Id. (citation omitted).
12. Faris, 332 F.3d at 320.
13. The Fourth Circuit is the Federal Court of Appeals for Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.
14. See 415 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2005), reh'g granted, No. 04-1525, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
15744 (4th Cir. 2006).
[Vol 82:525
SIGNED GENERAL RELEASES MAY BE WORTH LESS
tive and retrospective waiver 15 or release of the FMLA's "substantive"'16
and "proscriptive"' 17 rights. 18 However, the Fourth Circuit managed to cre-
ate a caveat that makes post-dispute waiver or settlement agreements of
FMLA rights enforceable, despite its interpretation that such waivers are
generally barred by § 825.220(d). 19 The catch is that one must obtain the
prior approval of the Department of Labor 20 ("DOL"), the agency charged
with administering the FMLA, or a court. 21 Thus, the Fourth Circuit held
that § 825.220(d) allows an employee to waive FMLA rights with the prior
approval of the Department of Labor or a court,22 while at the same time
maintaining that the "plain language" of § 825.220(d) bars the prospective
and retrospective waiver or release of the FMLA's substantive and pro-
scriptive rights.23 The Fourth Circuit's conclusion is inconsistent, to say the
least. Also troubling is the fact that the plaintiff in Taylor was no longer an
employee when she signed the waiver agreement. 24 Arguably, the plaintiff
in Taylor should not have been prohibited from waiving even her substan-
tive rights under the FMLA, because she was not an "employee" 25 in the
first place, and thus not covered by the prohibiting regulation. 26
15. A right can be waived either prospectively or retrospectively. Black's Law Dictionary defines
the term "prospective waiver" as "[a] waiver of something that has not yet occurred, such as a contrac-
tual waiver of future claims for discrimination upon settlement of a lawsuit." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1612 (8th ed. 2004). By contrast the adjective "retrospective" is used to describe "matters
that have occurred in the past." Id. at 1343.
16. According to the Taylor court, the substantive rights that are included in the FMLA are
[1] an employee's right to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in any one-year period be-
cause of a serious health condition; [2] the right to take such leave on an intermittent basis, or
on a reduced work schedule, when medically necessary; and [3] the right to reinstatement fol-
lowing such leave.
Taylor, 415 F.3d at 369 (citations omitted). "Substantive" rights are also referred to as "prescriptive"
rights.
17. According to the Taylor court, the proscriptive fights that are included in the FMLA are (1)
the employee's right not to be discriminated against for exercising substantive FMLA rights or for
otherwise opposing any practice prohibited by the FMLA, and (2) the employee's right not to be retali-
ated against for exercising substantive FMLA rights or for otherwise opposing any practice prohibited
by the FMLA. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Congress directed the DOL, also known as the Secretary of Labor ("Secretary"), to issue
regulations "necessary to carry out" the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2000).
21. Taylor, 415 F.3d at 369.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 368.
24. Taylor signed and returned a general release to the defendants after her termination and was
therefore no longer an "employee" at the time she signed the release. See id. at 367.
25. The term "employee" consistently refers to current employees throughout the regulation. Faris
v. Williams WPC-I, Inc. (Faris v. Nextira LLC), 332 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2003).
26. The regulation speaks in terms of "employees" not former employees. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.220 (2005). The Fifth Circuit spends a good amount of its opinion discussing this issue but does
not resolve it. See Faris, 332 F.3d at 322.
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After carefully examining the decisions of both the Fifth and the
Fourth Circuits, this comment will argue that the Fifth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of § 825.220(d), that the regulation bars only the prospective waiver of
substantive rights under the FMLA and does not apply to the post-dispute
release or settlement of FMLA claims, leads to a better result. The plain
language of the regulation makes clear that it does not reach retaliation
claims made by former employees under the FMLA and that it favors the
post-dispute settlement of claims. Public policy favors the enforcement of
releases, and similar waivers are allowed and enforced under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act27 ("ADEA") and Title VII.28 Furthermore,
the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of § 825.220(d), that the regulation bars
the prospective and retrospective waiver or release of the FMLA's substan-
tive and proscriptive rights-absent DOL or court approval-is impractical
and inefficient.
Part I of this comment will examine the Fifth Circuit's decision in Fa-
ris v. Nextira LLC. Part II will analyze the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc. and contrast it with that of the Faris court.
Finally, Part III will demonstrate that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
the regulation leads to a better result than that of the Fourth Circuit.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN FARIS V. NEXTIRA LLC
In Faris v. Nextira LLC, the plaintiff Carol Fais began working as an
occupational health specialist for defendant Nextira LLC ("Nextira") in
November 1997.29 Her supervisor fired her in June 1999, citing poor per-
27. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act makes it unlawful for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this [Act].
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000) The prohibitions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are limited
to only those individuals who are at least forty years old. 29 U.S.C. § 63 1.
28. See, e.g, EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1091 (5th Cir. 1987) (ADEA), Rogers v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1986) (Title VII). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
makes it unlawful for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
29. 332 F.3dat318.
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formance. 30 Nextira gave Fais two weeks' pay in lieu of notice.31 Addi-
tionally, Nextira offered her an extra $4,063.32 as consideration for signing
a release that purported to waive her rights to, inter alia, "all other claims
arising under any other federal, state or local law or regulation .... -32
Nextira also provided Fais with a memorandum advising her that she had
forty-five days to consider the release and seven days to revoke or change
her mind if she did sign.33 The Fifth Circuit noted that Fais "understood
that the payment was in return for the signing of the release" and never
returned the payment to Nextira.34 Fais later sued her supervisor and Nex-
tira, claiming that she was fired in retaliation for asserting her fights under
the FMLA. 35 After discovery proceedings, the defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment on the issue of the enforceability of the release. 36 Faris
moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that the release was unen-
forceable under § 825.220(d). The district court denied the defendants'
motion and granted the plaintiff s.37 According to the district court, "the
plain language of the regulation dictated that FMLA claims are not waiv-
able."'38 The defendants appealed.
39
The defendants argued that the district court erred in its ruling that the
plain language of § 825.220(d) rendered the plaintiffs release void.40 Spe-
cifically, the defendants argued that the plain language of the regulation
does not reach the waivability of post-termination FMLA claims.
4 1
Alternatively, the defendants argued that even if § 825.220(d) was am-
biguous, the relevant law under similar statutes, such as Title VII and the
ADEA, and the common law's preference for waivability support the
limited reading they advocated. 42
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The $4,063.32 amount was equivalent to one month of







39. The Fifth Circuit granted the defendants leave to bring an interlocutory appeal. Id.
40. Id. at 319.
41. Id.
42. Id. The defendants also argued that if the Fifth Circuit found that the regulation did extend to
post-dispute waivers or settlements, then it was invalid under the Chevron test. The Fifth Circuit dis-
missed this argument, stating that it may not be considered on appeal because it was "not presented to
nor passed on by the district court ..... Id. at 319 n.2.
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The defendants in Faris supported their argument that the plain lan-
guage of § 825.220(d) does not reach retaliation claims brought by former
employees by pointing out that the regulation speaks in terms of "employ-
ees" and not former employees.43 The regulation reads "Employees cannot
waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their rights under
FMLA." 44 The defendants focused on the meaning of the term "employee"
and reasoned that the term could only refer to current employees, as former
employees are simply no longer employed.45 The FMLA defines "em-
ployee" with reference to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA"),46 which defines an employee as "any individual employed by an
employer. 47 The Fifth Circuit found this definition, by itself, unhelpful.
48
Moreover, the court found the term "employee" to be ambiguous as used in
the FMLA, because in certain situations it referred to current employees,
but in others it referred to former employees. 49 The Fifth Circuit reasoned
that in order to decide whether the waiver prohibition applied to retaliation
claims under the FMLA, it would have to look at the context in which the
term was used in § 825.220, specifically. 5°
The Fifth Circuit found that the term "employee" consistently and un-
ambiguously refers to current employees in § 825.220.5 1 The court empha-
sized that the regulation distinguishes between "employees" and
"prospective employees," which implies that the term "employee" encom-
passes only those who are currently employed.52 For example, § 825.220(c)
prohibits employers "from discriminating against employees or prospective
employees who have used FMLA leave."' 53 The Faris court cited other
examples that strongly supported its interpretation that "employee" as used
in § 825.220 refers only to current employees. 54 At the very least, the Fifth
43. Id. at 319.
44. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2005).
45. Faris, 332 F.3d at 319.
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000). The FLSA, covering a broad range of workers, establishes
federally mandated minimum wage and premium wage rates for overtime work. See Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §§ 6, 7, 12, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062-64, 1067 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
219) (setting forth minimum wage provision, overtime pay provision, and child labor provision). Origi-
nally set at forty-four hours, the standard workweek is now set at forty hours. See id. § 7(a).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).
48. Faris, 332 F.3d at 319.




53. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2005) (emphasis added).
54. For example, employers are prohibited from "transferring employees from one worksite to
another for the purpose of reducing worksites, or to keep worksites, below the 50-employee threshold
for employee eligibility under the Act .... "29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b)(1). Because companies can obvi-
[Vol 82:525
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Circuit concluded that there are "strong indications" in the regulation that
the term "employee" refers only to current employees and that it could not
successfully be argued that the use of the term "employee" unambiguously
includesformer employees. 55
The defendants' second major point was that § 825.220(d) extends
only to "substantive rights" under the FMLA and not to post-dispute re-
taliation claims. 56 The meaning of the phrase "rights under [the] FMLA"
was at issue. 57 The Fifth Circuit found that "several factors support the
interpretation that this regulation applies only to waiver of substantive
rights under the statute .... "58 First, the Fifth Circuit noted that both "[t]he
[FMLA] and regulation consistently use the term 'rights under the law' or
'rights under FMLA' to refer to the statutory rights to leave, certain condi-
tions of that leave, and restoration, as set forth in 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612-14."59
Yet, the Faris court observed that § 825.220 does not refer to the cause of
action for damages as a right under the FMLA.60
Next, the Faris court highlighted the title of the regulation: "How are
employees protected who request leave or otherwise assert FMLA
rights?"'61 The court stated that the regulation describes how FMLA rights
are protected and discusses the prohibition of discrimination as a means of
protecting those rights, and that a discrimination claim is never described
as an FMLA right itself in the regulation or elsewhere. 62 Therefore, the
Faris court concluded that § 825.220(d) must be read in accordance with
the heading, which describes protections for employees who "request leave
ously only transfer current employees, the Fifth Circuit found the use of the term "employee" in this
context as unambiguously referring to only current employees. The Fifth Circuit noted that both of the
examples immediately following the nonwaivability statement concerned current employees as well.
Faris, 332 F.3d at 320. The examples were as follows:
[E]mployees... cannot "trade off" the fight to take FMLA leave against some other benefit
offered by the employer. This does not prevent an employee's voluntary and uncoerced ac-
ceptance (not as a condition of employment) of a "light duty" assignment while recovering
from a serious health condition. In such a circumstance the employee's right to restoration to
the same or an equivalent position is available until 12 weeks have passed within the 12-
month period, including all FMLA leave taken and the period of "light duty."
29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d).
55. Faris, 332 F.3d at 320.
56. According to the Faris court, "substantive rights" under the FMLA include rights such as the
right to leave and the right to reinstatement. In contrast, a retaliation claim against an employer was not
considered to be a part of the "substantive rights" under the FMLA, but instead an exercise of those
rights. Id. at 320-21.








or otherwise assert FMLA rights," because it responds to that heading,
limiting waiver of rights considered in the heading. 63
The Fifth Circuit reiterated that the examples of nonwaivability used
in the regulation deal with prohibitions on the prospective waiver of sub-
stantive rights under the FMLA.64 The Faris court noted that in the exam-
ples, the rights to leave and restoration are "rights under [the] FMLA. ' '65
The court explained that a cause of action for retaliation was never ad-
dressed in the examples provided in the regulation.66 The Fifth Circuit rea-
soned that the cause of action for retaliation is a protection for FMLA
rights, the waiver of which is not prohibited, rather than a "right under [the]
FMLA." 67 Thus, the Fifth Circuit logically concluded that a plain reading
of § 825.220-that it does not prohibit the post-dispute settlement of
claims-was consistent with the rest of the language of the regulation. 68
The Fifth Circuit further supported its interpretation of § 825.220 by
arguing that public policy favored the enforcement of settlements and that
similar waivers are allowed in other regulatory schemes, such as the ADEA
and Title VII.69 Indeed, the Faris court emphasized that it enforces releases
and settlement agreements under the ADEA without question. 70 Moreover,
the Fifth Circuit stated that releases of Title VII claims are also commonly
enforced. 71 The Fifth Circuit found that there was "no good reason" why
the government would prohibit waiver of FMLA retaliation claims on the
one hand and yet favor waiver of retaliation claims under the ADEA and
Title VII on the other.72 The Fifth Circuit concluded that if the Secretary of
Labor ("Secretary") had intended to abandon the sound policy employed in







69. For example, the court stated,
[A]lthough an employee cannot waive the right to file a charge with the [Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")], the employee can waive not only the right to recover in
his or her own lawsuit but also the right to recover in a suit brought by the EEOC on the em-
ployee's behalf.
Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d
1085, 1091 (5th Cir. 1987)).
70. Id. (pointing out that waivers of the right to bring suit under the ADEA are enforced by the
Fifth Circuit and are not void against public policy).
71. "[A] general release of Title VII claims does not ordinarily violate public policy. To the
contrary, public policy favors voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims brought under
Title VII." Id. (quoting Rogers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1986)).
72. Id. at 322. The Faris court noted that the plaintiff also had not provided any such reason.
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to do so. 73 The Faris court pointed out that the regulation, besides showing
no signs of such an intent, uses examples that are "entirely consistent" with
the waiver requirements set out in the ADEA and Title VII.74 The Faris
court thus found the policies behind the ADEA and Title VII to be "highly
persuasive."
75
In sum, the Fifth Circuit held that § 825.220(d) bars only the prospec-
tive waiver of substantive rights under the FMLA and does not apply to the
post-dispute release or settlement of FMLA claims. 76 The Fifth Circuit
noted that its interpretation of the regulation was not only consistent with
public policy, but also with the law under similar regulatory schemes such
as the ADEA and Title VII.77 Therefore, because § 825.220(d) did not ren-
der the plaintiffs release unenforceable, the Faris court reversed and ren-
dered judgment for the defendants. 78
II. CRITIQUE OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN TAYLOR V.
PROGRESS ENERGY, INC.
In Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc.,79 the plaintiff, Barbara Taylor, be-
gan working for Carolina Power & Light Company ("CP & L"), a subsidi-
ary of defendant Progress Energy, Inc. ("Progress"), in the Document
Services Unit at North Carolina's Brunswick Nuclear Plant in 1993.80 In
April 2000, Taylor began experiencing pain and swelling in her right leg
and missed five days of work as a result. 81 Subsequently, Taylor did not go
to work for a number of days due to medical testing and treatment. 82
In August 2000, Taylor missed a full week of work and additional
days in the weeks following a spinal tap procedure. 83 Taylor then received
a written warning from her supervisor and the human resources department




76. Id. For a reminder of what constitutes a "prospective waiver," see supra note 15.
77. Faris, 332 F.3d at 322.
78. The Fifth Circuit also stated that while in practice, its holding may make the regulation appli-
cable only to current employees, as suggested by the defendants, that question remained unresolved. Id.
79. It is important to note that since the district court granted the defendant's summary judgment
motion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated the facts in the light most favorable to Taylor be-
cause she was the non-moving party. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 366 (4th Cir.





84. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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Taylor later missed an additional five days of work following medical test-
ing in November and six weeks following surgery in December.
85
In February 2001, Taylor received a poor productivity rating in her
performance evaluation for the previous year.86 In May 2001, as part of a
reduction in force, CP & L terminated Taylor's employment. 87 The com-
pany told Taylor that she was eligible to receive benefits under its transi-
tion plan, including seven weeks of paid administrative leave.
88
Furthermore, CP & L told Taylor that she would receive additional mone-
tary compensation if she signed and returned a general release 89 within
forty-five days.90 Taylor signed and returned the release within that period
and kept the check that CP & L sent her, which was roughly in the amount
of $12,000 pursuant to the terms of the release. 91
Nevertheless, Taylor sued Progress under 29 U.S.C. § 2617 on May 9,
2003.92 In her complaint, 93 Taylor alleged that Progress had violated the
FMLA. 94 Progress filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the
release that Taylor signed was a complete defense to Taylor's claim.95 Tay-
lor replied by arguing that 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) rendered the release
unenforceable with regard to her FMLA rights. 96 The district court granted
85. Id.
86. Id. Based on Taylor's poor productivity rating in her performance evaluation, Taylor received
only a I percent pay raise. The average raise for CP & L employees was 6 percent. Id.
87. Id. at 366-67.
88. Id. at 367.
89. The relevant portion of the release read,
GENERAL RELEASE OF CLAIMS. IN CONSIDERATION OF SEVERANCE PAYMENTS
MADE BY THE COMPANY, EMPLOYEE HEARBY RELEASES CP & L... FROM ALL
CLAIMS AND WAIVES ALL RIGHTS EMPLOYEE MAY HAVE OR CLAIM TO HAVE
RELATING TO EMPLOYEE'S EMPLOYMENT WITH CP & L ... OR EMPLOYEE'S
SEPARATION THEREFROM, arising from events which have occurred up to the date em-
ployee executes this General Release, including but not limited to, claims ... for re-
lief... arising under... the Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967,... the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,... Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.... [or] any other federal, state or local law.
Id. (internal quotations omitted). While the general release did not mention FMLA claims, Taylor's
FMLA claims fell into the catchall category of "other federal ... law" claims besides those specifically
mentioned in the release. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Taylor returned the signed release to CP & L on June 4, 2001.
92. Id.
93. In her complaint, Taylor sought an injunction directing Progress to rehire her, compensatory
damages, liquated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. Id. at 368.
94. Specifically, Taylor alleged that CP & L had violated the FMLA by "(1) not fully informing
her of her FMLA rights, (2) improperly denying her requests for medical leave, (3) terminating her
employment because of her medical absences, and (4) terminating her employment because she com-
plained about the company's violations of the FMLA." Id. at 367-68.
95. Id. at 368.
96. Id.
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Progress's motion for summary judgment and held that § 825.220(d) did
not bar enforcement of the release. 97 The district court held that
§ 825.220(d) prohibits only the prospective waiver of substantive FMLA
rights, consistent with the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Faris v. Nextira
LLC.98 Taylor appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Taylor argued that the district
court erred in granting Progress's summary judgment motion because
§ 825.220(d) precludes Progress from enforcing the release she signed with
respect to her FMLA rights.99 The Fourth Circuit sided with Taylor and
concluded that § 825.220(d) rendered the release unenforceable with regard
to her FMLA rights.100
Unlike the Fifth Circuit's decision in Faris, the Fourth Circuit did not
begin its analysis by defining the term "employee" in the regulation. 101 In
fact, the Fourth Circuit never even considered the straightforward reason-
ing that § 825.220(d) must not reach termination-based retaliation claims
under the FMLA, because the regulation speaks in terms of "employees"
and not former employees.102 Instead, the Fourth Circuit began its discus-
sion by defining two types of FMLA rights: substantive rights and proscrip-
tive rights. 103 Immediately thereafter, the Fourth Circuit proceeded to apply
the Chevron test 10 4 to determine whether the agency (the DOL) acted
within its discretion in enacting § 825.220(d). 105
Under Chevron, "legislative regulations are given controlling weight





101. Compare Taylor, 415 F.3d 364 (beginning its analysis by defining FMLA rights), with Faris v.
Williams WPC-I (Faris v. Nextira LLC), 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003) (beginning its analysis by defin-
ing the term "employee").
102. Compare Taylor, 415 F.3d 364 (failing to consider the distinction between employees and
former employees in the context of the regulation), with Faris, 332 F.3d 316 (discussing the distinction
between employees and former employees in the context of the regulation).
103. The Taylor court defines "substantive rights" as including
an employee's right to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in any one-year period be-
cause of a serious health condition; the right to take such leave on an intermittent basis, or on
a reduced work schedule, when medically necessary; and the right to reinstatement following
such leave.
Id. at 369 (citations omitted). In contrast, the Taylor court defines "proscriptive rights" as including "an
employee's right not to be discriminated or retaliated against for exercising substantive FMLA rights or
for otherwise opposing any practice made unlawful by the [FMLA]." Id. (citations omitted).
104. The Supreme Court unanimously developed the Chevron test, a two-step test with respect to
judicial review of agency interpretations of statutes the agencies administer, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
105. See Taylor, 415 F.3d at 369.
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ute." 106 A court reviewing an administrative agency's construction of a
statute is confronted with two questions. The first question to ask under the
Chevron test is whether Congress has directly spoken to the question at
issue. If Congress has directly addressed the precise question at issue and
Congress's intent on the matter is clear, then there is no need to move on to
the second question of the Chevron test because the reviewing court must
adhere to the unambiguous intent expressed by Congress. If, however, the
court finds that Congress has not directly spoken to the question at issue,
the court cannot impose its own construction of the statute, as it would do
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Thus, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous regarding the specific question at issue, the reviewing
court must ask the second question under the Chevron test, which is
"whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."10
7
As the Taylor court recognized, the first question to ask under the
Chevron test was whether Congress had directly spoken to the specific
question of whether employees could waive their rights under the
FMLA. 108 The Fourth Circuit noted that the FMLA did not explicitly pro-
vide for nor preclude the waiver or post-dispute settlement of claims.' 0 9
The Taylor court therefore concluded that Congress had not spoken directly
to this issue, which meant that Congress had authorized the Secretary (or
the DOL) to address the matter. 110 The court determined that before it
could move on to the second step of the Chevron test it had to figure out
what § 825.220(d) actually meant. Il l
The Taylor court began its analysis of the meaning of § 825.220(d) by
focusing on the language of the regulation that states, "[e]mployees cannot
waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their rights under
[the] FMLA." 112 According to the court, the above language does not limit
itself to precluding only the prospective waiver of FMLA rights. 13 The
Fourth Circuit highlighted the word "waive" and declared that no definition
of "waive" suggested that it has only a prospective connotation.1 14 To sup-
port its argument, the Fourth Circuit referred to the definition of "waive" in
106. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
107. Id. at 842-43.




112. See id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d)
(2005)).
113. Id. at 370.
114. Id.
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Black's Law Dictionary' 15 and Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary.116 While doing so, the Taylor court ignored the fact that the regula-
tion speaks only in terms of waiving "rights" and does not at all refer to the
settlement or release of "claims."' 17
The distinction between "rights" and "claims" is one that is recog-
nized by Congress. Congress explicitly acknowledged this distinction when
it regulated the waiver of "any rights or claim" in the Older Workers Bene-
fit Protection Act. 118 Therefore, if the DOL intended for § 825.220(d) to be
interpreted as prohibiting not only the waiver of rights under the FMLA but
also the release of FMLA claims, it would have expressly done so. Indeed,
in an amicus curiae brief in support of Progress's petition for rehearing en
banc, the Secretary lays the Fourth Circuit's "erroneous" interpretation of
§ 825.220(d) to rest by acknowledging that "[s]ection 220(d) bars only the
prospective waiver of FMLA rights; it has never been interpreted by the
Department as barring the private settlement of past FMLA claims."" 9
Furthermore, "[t]he regulation was never intended to restrict, nor has the
Secretary ever interpreted it as restricting, the retrospective settlement of
FMLA claims."' 120 This explains why several courts have addressed the
validity of the settlement of private FMLA claims without ever referring to
§ 825.220(d).1
2 1
Next, the Fourth Circuit highlighted the title of the regulation, just as
the Fifth Circuit in Faris had done, but the Fourth Circuit reached a differ-
ent conclusion. The Fourth Circuit explained that § 825.220 began with the
question, "How are employees protected who request leave or otherwise
115. "Black's defines 'waive' as '[t]o abandon, renounce, or surrender (a claim, privilege, right,
etc.); to give up (a right or claim) voluntarily."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1611 (8th ed. 2004)).
116. "Webster's defines 'waive' as 'to give up... :FORSAKE ... to withdraw.., to relinquish
voluntarily (as a legal right)... to refrain from pressing or enforcing (as a claim or
rule) ... RELINQUISH."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2570 (2002)).
117. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(1) (2000). If "rights" and "claims" were synonymous, then the use of one
of those terms would be sufficient. Congress used both.
119. Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee's Peti-
tion for Rehearing En Bane at 3, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., No. 04-1525, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
15744 (4th Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Brief for the Secretary of Labor].
120. Id. at 4.
121. See, e.g., Halvorson v. Boy Scouts of America, No. 99-5021, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 9648
(6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished); Kujawski v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group Inc., No. 00-
1151(DWF/AJB), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17578 (D. Minn. 2001); Riddell v. Medical Inter-Insurance
Exchange, 18 F. Supp. 2d 468 (D.N.J. 1998).
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assert FMLA rights?"'122 Unlike the Fifth Circuit, however, the Fourth Cir-
cuit read this title in conjunction with § 825.220(c) 123 and theorized that an
employee seeking redress for his or her employer's FMLA-based discrimi-
nation or retaliation is "otherwise assert[ing] FMLA rights," which is the
equivalent of asserting "rights under [the] FMLA," and such rights cannot
be waived. 124 Based on the cursory reasoning above, the Fourth Circuit
stated that it was therefore "clear" that the phrase "rights under [the]
FMLA" included both substantive rights and proscriptive rights. 1
25
Although the Fourth Circuit was correct in acknowledging the differ-
ence between substantive rights and proscriptive rights,126 it was wrong in
concluding that the regulation precluded both. As the Secretary pointed out,
the Taylor district court was correct in holding that § 825.220(d) "does not
preclude the post-dispute settlement of a claim alleging that those substan-
tive rights have been previously violated. What it does preclude is the pro-
spective bargaining away of those substantive rights."'127 The Taylor
district court even provided an illustrative example of exactly what
§ 825.220(d) prohibits: "For example, if an employer and employee signed
a 'contract' at the outset of employment in which the employee agreed to
waive all of her FMLA rights in exchange for $100, then such a contract
would not be enforceable." 128
The Fourth Circuit, apparently attempting to support the weak reason-
ing it used to ascertain the plain meaning of § 825.220(d), moved on to
examine the "Summary of Major Comments" published with the final ver-
sion of the FMLA implementing regulations. The Fourth Circuit pointed
out that although some businesses 29 and the United States Chamber of
Commerce had suggested that there be an "explicit allowance of waivers
and releases in connection with [the] settlement of FMLA claims and as
part of a severance package (as allowed under Title VII and ADEA claims,
122. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omit-
ted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.220), reh"g granted, No. 04-1525, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15744 (4th Cir.
2006).
123. Section 825.220(c) states that "employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative
factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions ...." 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.220(c).
124. Taylor, 415 F.3d at 370 (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).
125. Id.
126. See supra notes 16 and 17, for the Taylor court's definitions of "substantive" rights and
"proscriptive" rights.
127. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 119, at 4-5 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., No. 03-CV-73-H(l), slip op. at 12 (E.D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2004)).
128. Taylor, No. 03-CV-73-H(1), slip op. at 12.
129. Specifically, Nationsbank Corporation (Troutman Sanders) and Southern Electric Interna-
tional, Inc. (Troutman Sanders).
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for example),"' 130 the DOL "rejected"'131 this suggestion. 132 The Fourth
Circuit assumed that because the DOL did not adhere to the suggestion that
an explicit allowance be made for waivers and releases in the regulation,
the DOL must never have intended for § 825.220(d)'s waiver prohibition to
have only a prospective application. 133 Such an assumption is without
merit; a more reasonable conclusion as to why the Secretary chose to re-
main silent instead of making such an explicit allowance was because it
was unnecessary to do so, since the regulation does not apply to releases in
the first place.
However, there is no need to guess at what the DOL had in mind when
the DOL itself states exactly what it meant. The DOL pointed out that the
court
incorrectly interpreted the Department's silence as to the retrospective
settlement of FMLA claims in the preamble to the final regulations as an
indication that such settlements are prohibited under section 220(d). In-
stead, the Department's silence is correctly understood as an indication
that it did not perceive such settlements as falling within the scope of the
regulation.
As the examples in the preamble make clear, the Department
viewed section 220(d) as barring only the prospective waiver of
rights.1
34
Moreover, "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency."' 135 It is no wonder that the Fifth Circuit did not devote any lan-
guage from its opinion to this issue.
1 36
The Taylor court made its next mistake by assuming that the FMLA's
enforcement scheme was meant to parallel the FLSA's scheme merely
130. Summary of Major Comments: Family and Medical Leave Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2218 (Jan.
6, 1995).
131. The DOL's actual response to the suggestion was
The Department has given careful consideration to the comments received on this section and
has concluded that prohibitions against employees waiving their rights and employers induc-
ing employees to waive their rights constitute sound public policy under the FMLA, as is also
the case under other labor standards statutes such as the FLSA. This does not prevent an indi-
vidual employee on unpaid leave from returning to work quickly by accepting a "light duty"
or different assignment. Accordingly, the final rule is revised to allow for an employee's vol-
untary and uncoerced acceptance of a "light duty" assignment. An employee's right to resto-
ration to the same or an equivalent position would continue until 12 weeks have passed,
including all periods of FMLA leave and the "light duty" period.
Id. at 2218-19.
132. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 370-71 (4th Cir. 2005), reh 'g granted, No. 04-
1525, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15744 (4th Cir. 2006).
133. Id. at 371.
134. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 119, at 9 (citation omitted).
135. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
136. See Fars v. Williams WPC-I, Inc. (Faris v. Nextira LLC), 332 F.3d. 316 (5th Cir. 2003).
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because the DOL used the FLSA as one example where prohibitions
against employees waiving their rights constituted sound public policy. 137
Because the FLSA allowed employees to waive or settle their rights under
the FLSA with prior court or DOL approval, the Fourth Circuit reasoned
that the FMLA must allow the same. 138 Thus, although according to the
Fourth Circuit's own interpretation, the plain language of § 825.220(d)
prohibits both the prospective and retrospective waiver or release of an
employee's FMLA rights, 139 the court nonetheless held that an employee
may waive or settle his or her FMLA rights with the prior approval of a
court or the DOL. 140 As a result, the court effectively rewrote the regula-
tion.
First of all, unlike the FLSA, where Congress has expressly given the
DOL authority to supervise claims, 141 Congress has given no such author-
ity to the DOL in the FMLA. Moreover, while the Secretary has created an
administrative process pursuant to which the Wage and Hour Division in-
vestigates and tries to resolve FMLA complaints in the same manner that it
does FLSA complaints, it has never construed section 107(b)(1) 142 of the
FMLA as requiring its approval of all private settlements--"a unique, judi-
cially-imposed requirement under the FLSA."' 143 In fact, as the Secretary
noted, courts have consistently rejected attempts to apply such a require-
ment to other employment statutes. 144 For example, the ADEA contains an
enforcement provision that is expressly based on the FLSA. 145 However,
137. See supra note 131.
138. See Taylor, 415 F.3d at 371.
139. Id. at 368.
140. Id. at 371.
141. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2000) ("The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of the
unpaid minimum wages or the unpaid overtime compensation owing to any employee or employees
under section 206 or section 207 of this title.").
142. Section 107(b)(l) of the FMLA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to "receive, investigate, and
attempt to resolve complaints of violations" of the FMLA in the same manner that the Secretary re-
ceives, investigates, and attempts to resolve complaints of violations of sections 206 and 207 of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 § 107(b)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b)(1).
143. Section 107(b)(l) "provides the Secretary the authority to establish the same administrative
complaint procedure that she utilizes under the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. It
clearly does not, however, require the Secretary to supervise all FMLA settlements-a unique, judi-
cially-imposed requirement under the FLSA." Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 119, at 10.
144. Id. In addition, the Secretary itself noted that the Taylor court incorrectly relied on the FLSA
when it concluded that private settlements of FMLA claims were not permitted. Id.
145. The statute reads,
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and
procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of
this title [Fair Labor Standards Act], and subsection (c) of this section. Any act prohibited un-
der section 623 of this title shall be deemed to be a prohibited act under section 215 of [the
Fair Labor Standards Act]. Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chap-
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courts have consistently refused to apply any requirement that all settle-
ments of ADEA claims be approved by a court or an administrative agency,
and were correct to refuse arguments advocating such requirements.
146
The judicial bar against the private settlement of FLSA claims and the
ensuing requirement that all FLSA settlements be approved by the DOL or
a court is based on policy considerations that are unique to the FLSA. 14 7
The purpose of the FLSA is "to secure 'the lowest paid segment... a sub-
sistence wage," ' 148 whereas both the ADEA and FMLA are directed to-
ward "an entirely different segment of employees, many of whom were
highly paid and capable of securing legal assistance without difficulty."'
1 49
Indeed, the FLSA is a remedial statute that sets the floor for minimum
wage and overtime pay.1 50 Moreover, the FLSA was enacted in an effort to
protect the most vulnerable workers: those who lacked bargaining power
and therefore could not negotiate fair wages and reasonable work hours
with employers. 151
The policy considerations underlying the FMLA are unlike those be-
hind the FLSA and similar to those of the ADEA and Title VII.152 The
FMLA, like the ADEA and Title VII, protects all segments of the work-
force, not just low wage workers. Furthermore, unlike the FLSA, virtually
all claims that are brought under the FMLA are individual claims brought
by employees, just as they are under the ADEA and Title VII. 153 The
FMLA is more similar to the ADEA and Title VII, both of which permit
the unsupervised settlements of claims, than it is to the FLSA. The mere
fact that the FMLA's enforcement scheme was modeled after the FLSA's
provides no basis to conclude that Congress intended to transfer the limita-
tions of FLSA settlements into the FMLA, especially when the ADEA,
ter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for pur-
poses of sections 216 and 217 of [the Fair Labor Standards Act] ....
29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
146. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991) ("[N]othing in
the ADEA indicates that Congress intended that the EEOC be involved in all employment disputes.
Such disputes can be settled, for example, without any EEOC involvement."); Runyan v. Nat'l Cash
Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1043 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("[A] practice... has developed that
permits effectuating and recognizing settlements of ADEA disputes that employees and employers have
worked out in good faith without agency involvement.").
147. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 119, at 13.
148. Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1043 (alteration in original) (quoting D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328
U.S. 108, 116 (1946)).
149. Id. (distinguishing the ADEA from the FLSA).
150. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706-707 (1945).
151. Id.
152. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 119, at 13.
153. Id. at 13-14.
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which actually includes the same enforcement scheme of the FLSA, has no
such limitations.
The Fourth Circuit took a brief moment to note that its holding was
inconsistent with that of the Fifth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit's district
court. 154 The Fourth Circuit explained that the Fifth Circuit in Faris held
that the "plain reading" of § 825.220(d) made clear that the regulation only
prohibited the "prospective waiver of [substantive] rights, not the post-
dispute settlement of claims," and that both the Fifth Circuit and the district
court in Taylor agreed that § 825.220(d)'s prohibition did not apply to the
retrospective waiver or release of FMLA claims, nor to employees' waivers
or releases of discrimination or retaliation claims against their employ-
ers. 155 The Fourth Circuit announced that it disagreed with the Fifth Circuit
and the district court because § 825.220(d) "plainly prohibits the waiver or
release of FMLA claims" but nevertheless managed to add, in parenthesis,
"unless there is DOL or court approval."' 156
Finally, the Fourth Circuit decided that it was time to answer the sec-
ond question under the Chevron test, which was whether § 825.220(d) was
"based on a permissible construction" of the FMLA. 157 Progress argued
that the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the regulation bars enforcement of
Taylor's release meant that § 825.220(d) must therefore be deemed unen-
forceable, because it was inconsistent with the general public policy favor-
ing settlements and because congressional silence on the waiver issue
showed that Congress never intended to regulate the waiver or release of
FMLA claims. 158 Moreover, Progress argued that if the regulation was
interpreted as entirely prohibiting the waiver or release of all claims, then
the regulation is arbitrary and therefore invalid under the Chevron test. 1
59
The Taylor court essentially glossed over Progress's first argument by
stating that although it agreed that "there is a general public policy favoring
the post-dispute settlement of claims," consideration of such a policy sim-
ply had no place in the analysis of whether the regulation was based on a
permissible construction of the FMLA.160 The court spent even less time on
rejecting Progress's second argument that Congress's silence on the waiver
154. See Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 371-72 (4th Cir. 2005), reh'g granted, No.
04-1525, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15744 (4th Cir. 2006).
155. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Faris v. Williams WPC-1, Inc.
(Faris v. Nextira LLC), 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003)).
156. Id. at 372.
157. Id.
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issue demonstrated an intention not to regulate the waiver or release of
FMLA claims. The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument by merely reciting
a quote' 6' from a prior Fourth Circuit decision that was based on a belief
rather than laws or facts.
But in fact, Congress was not merely silent. As it turns out, Congress
had expressly rejected a provision that attempted to prohibit releases of
FMLA claims when it drafted the FMLA. In 1990, the House of Represen-
tatives attempted to pass the following provision: "Waiver of Rights Pro-
hibited. The rights and procedures provided by this Act may not be waived
by contract or otherwise, unless such waiver is part of a written settlement
agreed to and signed by the parties to the pending action or complaint un-
der this Act." 162 If Congress intended to bar the release of FMLA claims it
would have passed the above provision, but Congress did the exact oppo-
site. Moreover, not only did Congress reject this provision, it also failed to
include any similar provision in the FMLA. Therefore, Congress's silence
on the waiver issue after it expressly rejected the "Waiver of Rights Prohib-
ited" provision strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to prohibit
the waiver or release of FMLA claims.
The Fourth Circuit responded to Progress's third argument-that
§ 825.220(d) is an arbitrary regulation if it is interpreted as completely
barring the waiver or release of FMLA claims-by reiterating that employ-
ees could still waive their FMLA rights with prior court or DOL ap-
proval.163 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Progress's third and
final argument failed because the regulation did not completely bar the
waiver or release of FMLA claims and, as a result, was not "arbitrary." 64
The Taylor court's reasoning here is plainly wrong. Instead of focus-
ing on the plain meaning of § 825.220(d), which is what the Taylor court
was supposed to do, it interpreted the regulation using its own judicial gloss
that allows waivers or releases with prior DOL or court approval. Once the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the plain language of § 825.220(d) "prohibits
both the retrospective and prospective waiver or release of an employee's
FMLA rights,"'165 it was required to use that conclusion in deciding
whether the regulation is arbitrary. The Fourth Circuit, however, failed to
161. "We also reject Progress's second argument that Congress's silence on the question of waiver
should be interpreted as indicating an intent to allow the waiver or release of FMLA claims. We do so
because 'inferences from congressional silence, in the context of administrative law, are often treacher-
ous."' Id. (quoting EEOC v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 394 F.3d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 2005)).
162. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990, H.R. 770, 101st Congress, § 201(d) (1990).
163. Taylor, 415 F.3d at 373.
164. See id. at 375.
165. Id. at 368.
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do so and instead argued that the regulation is not arbitrary because the
Fourth Circuit would allow employees to waive their FMLA rights, even
though, according to the Taylor court, the "plain language" of the regula-
tion expressly prohibits this.166 The Fourth Circuit must have realized that
its interpretation of § 825.220(d), which bars the release of FMLA claims
altogether, would be unenforceable. Therefore, in an attempt to salvage its
own interpretation of the regulation, the Fourth Circuit relied on its own
judicial gloss. The Fourth Circuit's effort to save face, while creative, lacks
regulatory support. Indeed, the regulation states that "[e]mployees cannot
waive... their rights under [the] FMLA,"'167 and absolutely nowhere does
it include "unless the waiver has the prior approval of the DOL or a
court."
16 8
Next, the Fourth Circuit used an unrelated policy argument to support
the notion that § 825.220(d) is entirely consistent with the FMLA. The
Fourth Circuit argued that "[t]he FMLA was enacted to set a minimum
labor standard for family and medical leave .... ,"169 According to the
Fourth Circuit, this minimum standard was justified and necessary. 170 In-
deed, whether the FMLA's minimum standard was justified or necessary is
in no way relevant to the question of whether § 825.220(d) was based on a
permissible construction of the FMLA. Nor does it answer why the Fourth
Circuit believed that employees should not be able to voluntarily settle their
FMLA claims, a right these employees enjoy under the ADEA and Title
VII. Nevertheless, the Taylor court found that § 825.220(d) is not "arbi-
trary, capricious, or manifestly contrary" to the FMLA, but was instead
entirely consistent with the statute. 171 As a result, the Taylor court reversed
the district court's order granting the defendant's summary judgment mo-
tion. 172 The Fourth Circuit held that § 825.220(d) prohibits the prospective
and retrospective waiver or release of both the substantive and proscriptive
FMLA rights, except where prior approval from a court or the DOL was
obtained. 173
166. See id. at 373.
167. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2005).
168. This additional language can be found only in the Taylor court's opinion, not in the regulation
itself. Compare Taylor, 415 F.3d at 369 (requiring prior approval by the DOL or a court for the validity
of an employee's waiver of FMLA rights), with 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (including no language requir-
ing the prior approval of the DOL or a court).
169. Taylor, 415 F.3d at 374.
170. See id.
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The Taylor court's erroneous holding, however, was short lived be-
cause it was vacated after Progress filed a petition for rehearing en banc.1
74
The petition was supported by two amicus briefs, 175 one of which was filed
by the Department of Labor itself. On June 14, 2006, the Fourth Circuit
vacated its Taylor opinion and granted a panel rehearing of the case. 176 The
Fourth Circuit ordered both sides to file supplemental briefs by August 7,
2006 to address issues raised by the DOL's amicus curiae brief, but has
postponed panel reargument to a date uncertain. 177
III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(D)
LEADS TO THE BETTER RESULT
The Taylor court's decision that private parties cannot execute a valid
release of FMLA claims or settle such claims without the prior approval of
the DOL or a court178 has serious adverse effects on hundreds of thousands
of employers and employees within the Fourth Circuit and possibly else-
where. To begin, the Taylor court's decision inappropriately interferes with
both voluntary separation settlements and involuntary separation severance
pay agreements. Employers who necessarily have to reduce their workforce
routinely offer severance benefits to ease the hardships of their former em-
ployees. Some employers even offer early retirement incentives whenever
possible. These employers are offering benefits that are significantly
greater than what they are legally required to offer. So in exchange for
these extra benefits, employers reasonably ask that the employees who
accept these benefits sign a general release of claims.
But the Taylor court's decision renders these general releases unen-
forceable with regard to claims arising under the Family and Medical
Leave Act. 179 In this respect, employers who generously offer fat severance
packages in exchange for general releases that cover FMLA claims may be
getting much less than they bargained for. In fact, employers in this situa-
tion are not getting anything, other than a false sense of security, in ex-
174. Progress Energy, Inc. (the Defendant-Appellee) filed its Petition for Rehearing En Banc with
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on August 3, 2005. Although the petition was
denied, the Fourth Circuit agreed to a panel rehearing.
175. The first amicus curiae brief was submitted jointly by the Equal Employment Advisory Coun-
cil, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, and the Society for Human Resource
Management in support of the Defendant-Appellee's Petition for Rehearing En Banc on August 2,
2005. The second amicus curiae brief was submitted by the Secretary of Labor in support of the Defen-
dant-Appellee's Petition for Rehearing En Banc on August 16, 2005.
176. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., No. 04-1525, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15744 (4th Cir. 2006).
177. Order at 2, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., No. 04-1525 (4th Cir. July 17, 2006).




change for the extra benefits they are providing; the employees could cash
their severance checks, turn around, and sue the employer anyway with
respect to alleged FMLA claims.
But in the end, it is not just the employers who suffer as a result of the
Taylor court's decision; employees suffer as well. After all, it will not take
very long for employers to realize that the general releases that their em-
ployees sign are not worth the benefits being exchanged. As the Equal Em-
ployment Advisory Council and the Chamber of Commerce note in their
amicus curiae brief in support of Progress's petition for rehearing en banc,
the Taylor court's holding that a general release is unenforceable with re-
spect to FMLA claims without prior approval from the DOL or a court
"undermines the preclusionary effect of any general release of employment
claims in any context, reducing its value to employers and in turn what they
are willing to pay for it, to the ultimate detriment of the employees who are
the recipients of the consideration given for the release."'180 Indeed, the
ruling of the Fourth Circuit creates a disincentive for employers to offer
separation benefits at all, because the potential risk of employees accepting
the benefits only to turn around and sue their employers anyway, as the
plaintiffs in Faris and Taylor did, is a great one. Thus, massive layoffs will
still occur if the economy demands it, but because of the Fourth Circuit's
decision many of those laid off employees will have to go without the fat
severance checks they would have had.
The Taylor court seemed to assume that the consequences of its deci-
sion would not be a big deal. But as labor law attorneys have noticed, 18 1
this is simply not the case. Attorneys Joseph P. Harkins and Gary D.
Shapiro warn that
[a]lthough this decision currently applies to employers in the Fourth Cir-
cuit.., it is unclear what stance the other Courts of Appeals will take on
this issue and whether they will adopt the reasoning of Taylor or the
180. Brief Amici Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. in Support of Defen-
dant-Appellee's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3-4, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., No. 04-1525,
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15744 (4th Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Brief for the Equal Employment Advisory
Council].
181. Labor and Employment lawyers have not only noticed the consequences of the Taylor deci-
sion but are also writing about them in newsletters and action alerts. See, e.g., Can an Employer Secure
the Release of an FMLA Claim in the 4th Circuit?, LAB. & EMP. UPDATE (Buchanan Ingersoll PC,
Pittsburgh, Pa.), Nov. 2005, at 5; The Family and Medical Leave Act Bars Waivers--Or Does It?, EMP.
L. ALERT (Nixon Peabody LLP, New York, NY), Feb. 2004, at 2-3; Fourth Circuit Rules that Employ-
ees Cannot Waive Their FMLA Rights Without Court or DOL Approval, ALERT (Greenberg Traurig,
New York, N.Y.), July 2005, at 1-3; Ed Harold, Woman Takes Money, Signs Release, Sues Anyway;
Fourth Circuit Says "Okay," LAB. LETTER (Fisher & Phillips LLP, Atlanta, Ga.), Sept. 2005, at 3;
Melissa M. Kidd, Fourth Circuit Holds that a General Release Is No Bar to FMLA Claims, WoRKCTE
EMP. & BENEFITS LEGAL UPDATE (Helms Mulliss Wicker, Charlotte, N.C.), Aug. 18, 2005,
http://www.hmw.com/workcite/20050818.htm.
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Fifth Circuit in Faris. Because this type of circuit split may need to be
resolved by the Supreme Court, employers should be cautious when
drafting releases. 
182
David K. Haase and John W. Drury, writing for The National Law Journal,
have also focused on the consequences of the Taylor court's decision:
The implications of the 4th Circuit's decision are significant for the
many employers who condition severance benefits on employee agree-
ments to release the employer from liability. The implications also are
significant for situations where an employee threatens litigation and both
employer and employee wish to settle, but the potential for unenforce-
ability presents a potential obstacle.
183
These attorneys attempt to offer advice on how to deal with this "bad law"
but not without disclaimers like "[u]nder Taylor, there are no easy an-
swers," and "[t]his is not a complete solution."
184
The Secretary also realizes the impact of the Fourth Circuit's decision
and has stated that "[t]he consequences of the decision would be disastrous
both for employers who want to settle claims with finality and for employ-
ees who want to obtain the compensation due to them promptly .... ,"185
The Secretary also explains the impracticality of the Taylor court's deci-
sion, since the DOL has never established a system for reviewing all
FMLA settlements. In order for the DOL to comply with the Taylor court's
ruling, the DOL would have to "allocate significant resources" to create a
new system for reviewing settlement of "all FMLA complaints that are not
pending in court." 186 Moreover, the Secretary notes that the requirement
that the DOL or a court supervise all FMLA settlements will "harm em-
ployees" because their cases will not be resolved without long delays.
187
The EEOC and Chamber of Commerce agree:
[N]o process for obtaining supervision by DOL currently exists, and in-
deed would overwhelm the resources of the agency if it did. Accord-
ingly, employees will endure lengthy delays even if a release has been
negotiated with the assistance of competent private counsel and regard-
less of whether the dispute even involves an FMLA claim.
188
As has been shown above, the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
§ 825.220(d) is not only the correct interpretation of the regulation, sup-
182. Joseph P. Harkins & Gary D. Shapiro, Leave it Out? Family and Medical Leave Act Claims
May No Longer Be Waived by a General Release, ASAP (Littler Mendelson, P.C., S.F., Cal.), Aug.
2005, at 2.
183. David K. Haase & John W. Drury, Court Finds a Trap Hidden in Separation Agreements: The
4th Circuit Says Employees Cannot Waive Any FMLA Claims, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 9, 2006.
184. Id.; Harkins & Shapiro, supra note 182, at 2.
185. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 119, at 4 (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 14-15.
187. Id. at 15.
188. Brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council, supra note 180, at 5-6.
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ported by the DOL itself, but it is also the interpretation that leads to the
better result. Public policy supports and encourages the enforcement of
private settlements of employment disputes. Indeed, the freedom to con-
tract is a fundamental right in the United States and has been for longer
than one can remember. The Taylor court's decision interferes with this
right and does so for no good reason. Employers and employees should be
able to reach settlements without a big brother figure looking over their
shoulders, as they have been with respect to ADEA, Title VII, and FMLA
claims before the Fourth Circuit's "erroneous" decision came into play.
CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d), a
regulation issued pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
bars only the prospective waiver of substantive rights under the FMLA and
does not apply to the post-dispute release or settlement of FMLA claims.
Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit alternatively concluded that § 825.220(d)
prohibits the prospective and retrospective waiver or release of both the
substantive and proscriptive FMLA rights except where prior approval
from a court or the DOL is obtained. The DOL itself laid the Fourth Cir-
cuit's "erroneous" interpretation of § 825.220(d) to rest by acknowledging
that the regulation bars only the prospective waiver of FMLA rights, not
the private settlement of past FMLA claims.
The Taylor court's holding may end up being short lived because the
Fourth Circuit vacated its initial opinion and decided to rehear the case. If
upon rehearing the case, the Fourth Circuit does not depart from its initial
judgment, the consequences of its decision will be significant for many
employers. Employers will have no guarantee that the releases signed by
their employees, for which the employers have provided valuable consid-
eration, are enforceable with respect to FMLA claims. However, if allowed
to stand, the Taylor court's decision won't be one to discriminate; it is sure
to harm employees as well. Since the DOL does not currently have the
resources, or any process for obtaining supervision for all FMLA settle-
ments in place, employees would face lengthy delays, even when their
release has been negotiated by competent private counsel.
For the many reasons articulated in this comment, the Fourth Circuit
should reach the correct result upon rehearing the Taylor case. If this does
not happen, the Supreme Court should step in and resolve this circuit split
in favor of the Fifth Circuit's Faris decision before the damaging results of
the Fourth Circuit's Taylor decision escalate.
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